We analyze a competitive research-oriented public program established in Spain, the Ramon y Cajal Program, intended to o¤er contracts in public research centers to high-quality researchers. We study the e¤ects of the Program on the ex-post scienti…c productivity of its recipients, relative to unsuccessful applicants with comparable curricula at the time of application. The full sample results demonstrate that the Program has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the scienti…c impact of the recipients, as measured by the average and the maximum impact factors, but the e¤ect on the number of published papers is not signi…cant. Consequently, receiving a contract does not signi…cantly a¤ect the quantity, but increases the quality, of the contract recipients'publications. This result is primarily driven by the particular relevance of experimental sciences in the Program.
Introduction
The Ramon y Cajal Program is a targeted grant-based policy initiative -named after the In this paper, we assess the e¤ect of the Program on the scienti…c productivity of applicants a few years after application. We exploit data on applications in several calls of the Program, provided by the Direccion General de Investigacion of the former Ministry of Science and Innovation. 1 We complement these data with individual and curricular information on the applicants. We compare successful and unsuccessful applicants using two alternative empirical approaches: linear regression and matching. Our results indicate that contract recipients did not generate a larger number of published contributions, but their scienti…c impact increased, measured by either the average or the maximum impact of these contributions, with respect to applicants who were not selected by the Program but were comparable in accordance with their curricula at the time of application. 1 The ministerial arrangements were redesigned after the March 2004 elections, and the Ministry of Science and Technology was eliminated. Its competences were reallocated to the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce and to the Ministry of Education and Science, which undertook the S&T competences, including the Ramon y Cajal Program. Since the November 2011 elections, these competences have been the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and Competitiveness.
Our paper belongs to the economic literature on science (Stephan, 1996) . This literature initially focused, almost exclusively, on the e¤ect of science on growth through its relationship with technology. Following the development of human capital models in the 1960s, economic research puts its attention on the labor market of scientists. A further line of research that studies reward incentives for scientists was introduced from the sociology of science. Until very recently, little attention has been paid to productivity of scienti…c research, particularly how scienti…c outcomes might be a¤ected by resource funding. There are several studies that have analyzed the impact of grant funding on the scienti…c productivity. The studies di¤er in the research area under consideration, the measures of scienti…c productivity (patents, number of publications, citations of published articles, etc.), the unit for which productivity is measured (aggregate research group, individual researchers, head of the research group, etc.), the country and the funding scheme.
Arora et al. (1998) investigate the e¤ects of a public funding program in biotechnology
and bio-instrumentation in Italy on the publication records of grants research groups. They …nd positive, but heterogeneous e¤ects, which are higher the better their past publication performance. Arora and Gambardella (2005) assess the e¤ect of NSF grants in the …eld of economics on publication output, …nding a small impact, except for younger scholars. Our work contributes to this literature by evaluating the impact on the individual scienti…c productivity of a hiring policy, instead of project-based research funding, targeted at young researchers in any research area. The fact that the hiring policy is aimed at young researchers avoids confounding e¤ects associated with di¤erences in scienti…c maturity and productivity in the life cycle. We also propose a measure of scienti…c impact that permits comparison between di¤erent areas.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the …rst evaluation of the Program's impact on the performance of contract recipients. However, several previous studies have analyzed According to Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez (2005), the Ramon y Cajal Program provided short-term relief for the key problems of the system that it was intended to address.
Particularly it improved the employment opportunities, working conditions and academic career prospects of PhDs. On the supply side, the e¤ects of the Program "have been pressurizing the PRCs to develop strategies for human resource recruitment by research …eld, and organizing their priorities in terms of competitive research capabilities"-. Overall, the professional community has claimed that the Program "o¤ers a rare opportunity for young scientists trying to gain a foothold in the rigid Spanish academic system"(see Schiermeier, 2004 ). Our results allow us to conclude that the Ramon y Cajal recipients were able to achieve a quality level above that of comparable applicants not selected by the Program.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the Program and the institutional context in which it was implemented. In section 3, we introduce the main data set of applications, and the complementary data set on the applicants'curricular information and preliminary results. In section 4, we present our empirical approach.
In section 5, we evaluate the e¤ectiveness of the Program with respect to the scienti…c productivity of successful applicants. In section 6, we summarize the major results and discuss their policy implications, and conclude.
The Ramon y Cajal Program
The Spanish Government implemented the Ramon y Cajal Program in 2001 to meet the speci…c needs of the Spanish S&T system. At the time it was created, the low level of R&D investment and the scarcity of researchers were considered two of the central problems in the Spanish S&T system. In 2001, the share of gross domestic expenditures in R&D relative to GDP in Spain was 0.91 percent, which contrasts with the averages of 1.76 percent in the EU-27 and 2.27 percent in the OECD. In that same year, the number of researchers as a share of total employment in Spain amounted to 4.7 per thousand, below the EU-27 average of 5.3 and the OECD average of 6.8 per thousand (see OECD, 2007) . However, R&D personnel in Spain had been increasing rapidly: Six years before, in 1995, the share of R&D personnel in total employment was only 3.5 per thousand. 2 As there was no corresponding increase in R&D funding, the growth in research personnel was primarily achieved through the creation of precarious jobs.
To understand the emergence of this trend, we need to consider the 1970s. At that time, the training of new PhDs through doctoral programs was a political objective that 2 According to Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez (2005), part of this increase might be due to statistical adjustment. Since 2000, doctoral and post-doctoral personnel with fellowships (but not contracts) are counted as researchers.
became governmental policy (Fernández-Esquinas, 2002 ). Since the mid-1980s, there was a steady increase in the availability of four-year public grants to fund doctoral studies (see Sanz-Menéndez, 1997). As a consequence of this policy, in 2000, there were more than 60,000 PhD students in Spain, and approximately 6,000 students received their PhD every year, these …gures being three times those at the beginning of the 1980s (see Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez, 2005).
However, this increase in the supply of PhDs was not accompanied by a similar increase in job positions for researchers. At the end of the 1990s, access to a permanent research position or a promotion became more di¢ cult than had been previously. The labor market for graduate students and experienced PhDs lacked a career path. Fellowships (typically tied to project funding) became the regular labor relationship. Therefore, the Spanish labor market for researchers in the late 1990s was characterized by both a very high proportion The Program was also intended to provide the PRCs with incentives to align their strategic priorities with their human resources practices. This was implemented by establishing a …nancial co-responsibility scheme between the PRCs and the Government. This scheme discouraged the PRCs from training and increasing the stock of researchers without a well-de…ned career path who were seeking the opportunity to hold positions within the system (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez, 2005). Another concern, held both by legislators and in the public arena, was the need to eliminate the favoritism that prevailed in Spanish PRCs (see Bosch, 2001b ). This concern was crucial in determining the selection procedures accomplished in the Program.
When the Ramon y Cajal Program was launched, there was a pervasive perception, spread by the mass media, of a signi…cant brain drain on the Spanish S&T system and a belief that many Spanish PhD graduates working abroad could be enticed to return if they were provided with improved career opportunities.
The …rst call for applications by the Ramon y Cajal Program, in 2001, attracted approximately 2; 800 applicants and o¤ered 800 contracts, with a total annual expenditure of 35 million euros. The recipients would receive a …ve-year contract with an annual wage of nearly 29; 000 euros, similar to the wage of a newly tenured professor ("profesor titular") in Spanish PRCs. In the second and third calls, in 2002 and 2003, 500 and 700 contracts, were o¤ered, respectively, attracting more than 2; 500 applications in each call. 3 The number of contracts o¤ered decreased substantially after 2003.
To ensure a transparent selection process and prevent the possibility of favoritism, the selection procedure was centralized in an evaluation agency, the "Agencia Nacional de Evaluación y Prospectiva"(ANEP). This procedure, centralized and external to the PRCs, was a novel feature of the public policy's design. Its success relied on the involvement of the PRCs, which agreed to be excluded from the selection process while co-…nancing the hiring of the selected researchers. Despite its transparency, candidate eligibility was subject to the endorsement of the PRCs in the …rst two calls: applicants were required to obtain an endorsement letter from at least one PRC, which committed the PRC to hire her if selected.
This feature attracted international attention (see Bosch, 2001b to have a PhD and a minimum of an 18-months research stay, at a research center other than that from which the applicant's college degree was obtained. 5 In Table 1 , we provide the distribution of applications and contracts for these 2 years, broken down by gender, PhD tenure, and research area. We have aggregated the 24 areas designated by the ANEP into 10 broader areas. 6 The …rst six areas correspond to experimental disciplines (Physics, Earth Sciences, Chemistry, Agriculture, Biomedical and Additionally, the success rate is higher for men than for women.
The curricular information has been collected from a complementary data source, the free online resource Publish or Perish (Harzing, 2007) . Publish or Perish retrieves academic contributions by author using the Google Scholar database, which provides the title, source, year and authors of the contribution. Google Scholar is generally praised for its speed (Bosman et al., 2006 ) and high correlation with alternative bibliometric sources (see Harzing, 2012 , and Harzing and van der Wal, 2011, for a comparison of citation analyses using di¤erent data sources). Whenever the contribution was published in a scienti…c journal, the journal information is also reported. For each applicant, we measure her number of distinct contributions and, among these, the number of published papers.
To We use three measures of the scienti…c quality of each applicant: her number of contributions listed in the JCR database, the average impact factor of her JCR publications, and the maximum impact factor among the JCR journals in which she has published. The two impact factor measures are based on the corresponding impact of the journal in which she published each contribution.
In Table 2 we summarize the curricular information of applicants by contract status.
Furthermore, we break down the sample by applicants' characteristics: gender, research area, and time elapsed since PhD receipt. 7 For all categories considered, we observe that, at the time of the call, contract recipients have, on average, more published contributions and a greater scienti…c impact (either average or maximum impact) than non recipients.
Nevertheless, given the high standard deviations, most di¤erences are not signi…cant. We also …nd that the three measures of scienti…c quality di¤er substantially by area, re ‡ecting di¤erences in the typical number of papers and citations across research …elds, and therefore the impact indices are not comparable across areas.
To provide a measure of scienti…c impact that permits comparisons across areas, we constructed the relative rank or position of each researcher with respect to the empirical distribution of impacts of all JCR journals in her research area. We computed the quan-tile (between 1 and 99) of the corresponding empirical distribution of the journal impact achieved by each researcher given her average and her maximum impact factor, which we have denoted "Rank average IF" and "Rank maximum IF", respectively. For instance, a researcher who published a paper in the journal with the highest impact in her area would have a Rank maximum IF of 99.
In Table 3 , we report the sample median, 75th and 90th quantiles of the curricular information and the two aforementioned ranks, by contract status, and broken down by research areas. Regarding our measures of the applicants' scienti…c quality (number of papers, average impact factor and maximum impact factor), the empirical distributions di¤er substantially depending on the contract status. Speci…cally, those receiving a contract tend to have a larger number of papers and a greater impact than those without a contract.
This evidence agrees with the criteria established by the committees in the selection of applicants, which emphasize their scienti…c quality.
However, we observe that for contract recipients, the median number of papers and the impact at the time of application is zero in most areas. We believe that selection committees
were taking other quality features into consideration at the moment of application that are unobserved in our dataset. Speci…cally, we have measured each applicant's scienti…c merits using her contributions published in JCR journals up to the year of application. However, unlike the selection committee, we cannot observe papers under revision, forthcoming papers (not yet published in the year of the call) and, to a lesser extent, the quality of the candidate's research agenda, among others. For most areas, we observe strong di¤erences by contract status for the highest quartile of the distribution. In terms of both the average and maximum impact, the highest quartile of researchers with a contract achieve high positions within the impact distribution in their corresponding area, approaching ranks above 85 in all experimental disciplines except Engineering. These disciplines amount to 75 percent of all contracts. In Economics, the highest quartile of researchers rank above The results suggest the quality of the researchers selected and the existence of comparable candidates in most of the research areas considered. However, as reported in Table 3 
Empirical approach
We consider the scienti…c output of applicants in the four years after the call to assess the impact of contract status on the ex-post performance of researchers. Given the data constraints, we consider the time horizon selected to be su¢ cient to test the potential in ‡uence of the contract. Moreover, it is consistent with the usual time span the PRCs take to make tenure decisions, and with the maximum length of time required for scienti…c contributions to undergo a peer-reviewed publication process.
Our relevant policy variable is a binary variable D i indicating whether the individual was granted a Ramón y Cajal contract, with value 1 if the researcher i has been awarded a contract and 0 otherwise. Our concern is whether the contract status a¤ects the researcher's productivity outcome Y i in the four-year period after the call. We perform the analysis using three alternative outcome variables that measure researchers'scienti…c performance.
These variables are the number of contributions published in journals listed in the JCR, the average impact of such contributions, and the maximum impact factor among the JCR journals in which a researcher has published.
The ideal evaluation problem, for researcher i, consists in comparing two potential outcomes depending on whether she received a contract or did not, denoted as Y 1i and Y 0i , respectively. If both counterfactual outcomes were observed, the treatment e¤ect, i.e., the impact of the contract for researcher i, would simply be (Y 1i Y 0i ). 
If the contract status were purely random, and thus independent of the potential outcomes, then the three evaluation measures would be equivalent,
and hence, the average e¤ect of the contract would simply be
In this case, a naive mean-di¤erence estimator based on the sample means of the observed outcomes for recipients and non-recipients would consistently estimate the causal e¤ect of the contract. This result also holds under the weaker assumption of mean-independence between the contract and the potential outcomes.
However, we know that contract status depends on researchers' characteristics, and therefore researchers'potential outcomes Y 1i , Y 0i are not independent of the contract status D i . To see this, notice that the observed di¤erence in outcomes between recipients and non-recipients can be written as
where the second term on the right-hand side of the equation measures the potential selection bias arising because recipients and non-recipients could perform di¤erently even in the absence of the contract. Under the (weaker) assumption that Y 0i is mean-independent of D i (without imposing restrictions regarding Y 1i and D i ), the selection bias would be zero. Hence, a naive mean-di¤erences estimator would yield a consistent estimate of the ATT. However, it is unlikely that the mean-independence assumption will be supported if contract status depends on the scienti…c quality of researchers, as observed at the time of application. Presumably, a naive mean-di¤erence estimator is expected to exacerbate the positive impact of the contract, as contract recipients would likely be more productive than non recipients even in the absence of the contract.
As potential outcomes are not independent of contract status, identi…cation requires the availability of individual pre-contract information and assumptions regarding the relationship between contract status and potential outcomes, conditional on such additional information. The main idea is that contract status is purely random for individuals with similar pre-contract information. We consider two alternative approaches: parametric (regression) and non-parametric (matching). We …rst describe the problem in the regression framework to illustrate how we can circumvent selection bias by exploiting additional information.
For each researcher i, we can write her two potential outcomes as Y ji = j + v ji , where E (Y ji ) = j and v ji captures the unobserved individual deviation of the potential outcome j with respect to the mean population value j , with E (v ji ) = 0 for j = 0; 1. The ATE is given by 1 0 . We can write the observed outcome for researcher i as a simple linear projection on the contract status,
where the slope = 1 0 is the ATE and the error term is
The simple OLS estimator of in (4) yields the aforementioned naive mean-di¤erence estimator based on the sample means of the observed outcome for recipients and nonrecipients. This estimator would consistently estimate the ATE provided that the error term is mean-independent of contract status, i.e., E(u i j D i ) = 0. However, we should
, as recipients are expected to be more productive than non-recipients. There is a selection bias, and therefore E(u i j D i ) 6 = 0.
Nevertheless, if we observed additional variables that contain pre-contract information, we could exploit them to circumvent selection bias. Let X i be a vector of additional covariates, including the researcher's curricular information and other relevant variables at the time of application. Consider the assumption that, conditional on the covariates included in X i , the potential outcomes are mean-independent of D i , i.e.,
This conditional mean-independence assumption is also called "selection on observables", as it states that X i determines contract status. We also need to assume parametric speci…cations for E (v 1i j X i ) and E (v 0i j X i ) ; which are typically assumed to be linear in parameters. Under such assumptions, we can write the augmented model as
where now E (u i j D i ; X i ) = 0. It can be seen that the causal e¤ect for researcher i is equal to + 0 X i , meaning that it varies with the values of the conditioning variables. To calculate the ATE, we must evaluate this expression at E (X i ), while to calculate the ATT and the ATC, it must be evaluated at E (X i j D i = 1) and E (X i j D i = 0), respectively (see Wooldridge, 2002 ). Under the above assumptions, OLS estimation of (6) will yield a consistent estimate of the impact of the contract. 9 As an alternative to regression analysis, we can follow a non-parametric approach and produce matching estimators of the impact of the contract, using the individual pre-contract information mentioned above. If, for individuals with similar pre-contract information, contract status can be considered as purely random, we can estimate the corresponding counterfactual outcome for each contract recipient using the average outcome for non-recipients with similar pre-contract information. Matching estimators rely on a stronger version of the selection on observables assumption, by which, conditional on X i , treatment status is independent of potential outcomes (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983 ). However, unlike regression analysis, matching estimators do not require parametric assumptions. The conditional independence assumption allows us to analyze our observational data as if they came from a randomized experiment.
Following Abadie and Imbens (2011), we implement bias-corrected matching estimators,
which employ a regression adjustment to circumvent the …nite-sample bias that arises when the matching is not exact. The matches are directly based on the same curricular covariates used in the regression. There are two reasons that we do not employ a propensity score approach to match treatment and comparison observations. First, given the small number of covariates, we do not have a serious dimensionality problem. Second, and more important, propensity score matching is based on …rst-step estimates of the unknown propensity score. It is di¢ cult to derive the asymptotic variance of the matching estimator when estimated propensity scores, instead of (unknown) actual propensity scores, are used (see Abadie and Imbens, 2009 9 If we also assume that the average gain in productivity from receiving the contract has zero conditional mean, i.e., E ( v 1i v 0i j X i ) = 0, then E ( v 1i j X i ) = E ( v 0 j X i ), and hence, by conditioning on the X i we obtain the model
This speci…cation establishes that, conditional on X i , the causal e¤ect of the contract is the same for any applicant and equal to . In particular, the causal e¤ect of the contract for the entire population of applicants (ATE) coincides with the causal e¤ect of the contract for recipients (ATT) and the causal e¤ect for non-recipients (ATC).
derive the asymptotic variance for the bias-corrected matching estimator that we use, which is implemented in a Stata routine that is fully documented in Abadie, Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2003).
The performance of Ramón y Cajal researchers
We estimate the causal e¤ects of the contract, conditional on researcher characteristics at the time of application, to overcome the selection bias due to the endogeneity of contract status. The validity of the conditional estimates of the causal e¤ects relies on the absence of unobserved di¤erences across researchers associated with contract status that a¤ect their potential outcomes. The covariates we consider in the empirical analysis are related to the researcher's curricular information at the time of application, the time elapsed since PhD receipt and her research area. We consider alternative parametric (regression) and non-parametric (matching) procedures using this set of conditioning variables. Regarding the researcher's curricular information, we use the number of JCR papers and the average impact factor. In the case of regression, we use a second-order polynomial on these two variables, while in the case of matching we simply consider these two variables and the cross-product between them. In both cases, we compute three measures of the causal e¤ects. First, the ATE, which measures the average e¤ect of the contract irrespective of contract status. Second, we estimate the ATT, which measures the average e¤ect of the contract for those researchers who actually had a contract. Finally, we consider the ATC, which measures the average e¤ect of the contract for unsuccessful applicants. For the sake of comparison, we also calculate the naive unconditional estimates of the impact of the contract in (4), which presumably tend to overestimate the causal e¤ect of the contract on scienti…c productivity.
The main outcomes that we consider to measure scienti…c productivity in the four-year period after the application are the number of JCR papers published by the researcher and the scienti…c impact measure of her JCR contributions during that period. As impact measures, we use the aforementioned average and maximum impact factors. For each outcome variable, we produce full sample estimates (for all researchers) and separate estimates by research area.
Given the di¤erences in the impact levels that a¤ect the comparability of impact measures across areas, we produced normalized outcome variables of the average impact and the maximum impact, the units of measurement of which are comparable across areas.
These outcome variables measure the rank or relative position that each researcher would achieve within her research area with respect to the empirical distribution of impact of the journals in that area. The rank provides the percentile that the researcher would reach within this empirical impact distribution. The ranks have been calculated for our two impact measures, average and maximum impact.
In Table 4 , we report the estimates of the impact of the contract on each outcome measure. The naive estimates are both positive and signi…cant for every outcome considered. These estimates may su¤er from a positive selection bias, which is con…rmed by the conditional estimates (both regression and matching) of the causal e¤ects, which employ the researchers'pre-contract characteristics as covariates.
The conditional estimates are also positive, but their magnitudes are much lower. Further, the magnitudes of the regression and matching estimates are very similar. For all of the quantity (the number of JCR papers) and the quality (impact) measures, the ATE is positive and signi…cant. These results indicate that the contract would have, on average, a positive e¤ect on both the quantity and quality of the scienti…c production of a randomly chosen applicant. However, when we distinguish by actual contract status, we observe remarkable di¤erences.
In the case of contract recipients, the causal e¤ect of the contract is positive, but not signi…cant, on the number of papers, but positive and signi…cant on any impact measure (average impact, maximum impact, and the two corresponding rank impact measures).
These results are similar for the regression and matching estimations. Consequently, contract status does not imply a signi…cant increase in the number of published contributions, but a¤ects the scienti…c in ‡uence of the recipients. Using either of the two rank measures, we …nd that, on average, the receipt of a contract causes recipients to shift 3 percentiles upwards within the impact distribution. In Table 5 , we have calculated the causal e¤ects (Merton, 1968) . Second, higher reputation in the early years will ease access to research funding, thus increasing the chances to undertake independent research.
In the case of non-recipients, the evidence is mixed. Although the estimated ATC is positive for every outcome, the signi…cance of these estimates depends on the estimation method. The regression estimates exhibit positive and signi…cant e¤ects for quantity, measured by the number of papers, but only for one quality measure: the rank based on the average impact factor. However, in the case of the matching estimates, the e¤ect on quantity is not signi…cant while the e¤ects on the quality measures are positive and signi…cant. Moreover, the ATC estimates are generally smaller than the ATT estimates, but because the levels of the curricular variables at the time of application are also smaller, the relative di¤erences between ATT and ATC are low. If we consider the regression estimates that are signi…cant, the causal e¤ect of the contract on quantity for non-recipients would be approximately 16 percent, and having a contract would shift non-recipients 2 percentiles upward in the average impact distribution.
In Tables 6 to 8 we have reported the estimates of the causal e¤ects, by research area, on the number of papers and on the average and the maximum impact. When we disaggregate by areas, di¤erences appear. For the experimental disciplines, the results generally resemble the full sample estimates in Table 4 , but the precision of the estimates decreases. We must recall that experimental sciences account for 80 percent of the contracts, and hence the full sample results are primarily driven by these disciplines. Further, the number of observations in non-experimental disciplines is much lower than in experimental disciplines, as shown by Table 1 . Speci…cally, in Mathematics, Economics and Social Sciences & Law, the number of contract recipients is 31 or lower in each area. This may a¤ect the precision and the sensitivity of our results to the estimation method or the existence of outliers or in ‡uential observations.
Regarding the causal e¤ect on quantity, Table 6 reports naive estimates that are generally positive and signi…cant, except for Arts & Humanities, which exhibits a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient. When we consider the conditional estimates, the causal effects are generally positive, but much smaller than the naive estimates, and mostly non signi…cant, again with exception of the negative e¤ect for Arts & Humanities. We also observe substantial di¤erences between the regression and matching estimates with respect to the magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients. The ATT is signi…cant and positive for Chemistry and Mathematics, and the ATC is signi…cant and positive for Earth Sciences, Chemistry and Engineering, but only for one of the estimation methods (either regression or matching).
Regarding the causal e¤ect of the contract on the researchers'average scholarly impact, reported in Table 7 , we observe that the naive estimates are signi…cantly positive in most areas. The conditional estimates are generally positive, but smaller in magnitude and less precise than the naive estimates. The regression and matching estimators yield very similar results. In the case of experimental disciplines, the ATT estimates are positive and signi…cant for three areas: Physics, Biomedical and Engineering. The causal e¤ect on researchers with a contract exceeds 40 percent in Engineering and Physics. In this latter case, the e¤ect seems remarkable, as the average impact factor for researchers at the time of application was approximately 2.1. Chemistry is the only area in which the ATC is signi…cant. This area received a substantial number of contracts (more than 200), and the result suggests that we could have expected gains in scienti…c productivity if additional non-recipients had bene…tted from a contract. With some di¤erences in magnitude and signi…cance, the estimates of the causal e¤ects on the maximum impact, presented in Table 8 , align with the results for the average impact. We do not …nd signi…cant e¤ects in
Biomedical but obtain signi…cantly positive e¤ects in Earth Sciences, for both recipients and non-recipients.
The results in Arts & Humanities are the opposite of the full sample results and the …ndings for most of the areas. We …nd that the causal e¤ect of a contract is signi…cantly negative on both quantity and quality, which, as mentioned above, might be related to the fact that researchers in certain non-experimental areas have yet to adopt international standards.
We have also considered alternative estimates, using alternative conditioning sets and a longer time span after the application, to evaluate the sensitivity of the results. Speci…cally, we have considered additional conditioning variables, such as the gender and the score that the assessment committee assigned to the researcher at the time of application, as well as the inclusion of the maximum IF among the curricular measures and di¤erent degrees of the polynomial in the curricular measures. The results (not reported here but available upon request) can be summarized as follows. First, we …nd that both the gender and the score were not signi…cant and did not increase the explanatory power of the regression estimates. The estimated causal e¤ects remain similar, yet the precision of the estimates is lower than in our reported results, when either of these two variables were included. The …nding that the score is not signi…cant is particularly interesting, as it suggests that there are no other substantial di¤erences between researchers, not captured by our observed curricular measures, which might a¤ect the comparison between them. Moreover, the selection of either the curricular measures or the functional form does not alter the main empirical results. When we considered the longer …ve-year time span after the application, the qualitative results, particularly those concerning the ATT, are unchanged. However, as we were only able to gather curricular information until 2007, we can only use applicant data from 2002, and hence the precision of the estimates is reduced. Overall, our results appear to be robust to the choice of conditioning variables, functional form, and time span after application.
Conclusions
The Ramon y Cajal Program constituted a novel policy measure and has become a relevant S&T instrument in Spain. The Program was designed to improve the working conditions and long-term employment prospects of a sizeable stock of postdoctoral researchers within the S&T system and attract numerous Spanish PhD graduates with high-quality scienti…c records who were working abroad.
Our paper studies whether a Ramon y Cajal contract a¤ects the subsequent research output of the researchers receiving it. We analyzed the e¤ect of the Program on the productivity of the selected researchers and compared them with scholars with similar curricular characteristics that were not awarded a Ramón y Cajal contract. We employed two alternative approaches to estimate the causal e¤ect of the contract: conditional regression and matching procedures. Overall, the results provided by the two methods are similar. They indicate that the Ramon y Cajal researchers were able to maintain a quality level above that of comparable applicants not selected by the Program.
In particular, our results demonstrate the success of the Program in increasing the scienti…c impact of young researchers in the Spanish S&T system, in several research areas.
This is an important result, which supports policies designed to increase the stock of human resources in scienti…c research to raise the international impact of the Spanish R&D system.
An early higher impact of a researcher contributes to boosting her scienti…c reputation, but also her future recognition through cumulative advantage. The evidence that early recognition in science disproportionately favors success in a scienti…c career (Allison and Stewart, 19674; Weiss and Lillard, 1982) emphasizes the importance of our …nding that contract status increases the scienti…c impact of the researchers.
The Program also had favorable e¤ects on the Spanish S&T system. We have sum- This has limited many of these researchers' prospects within the Spanish S&T system, jeopardizing the Program's achievements in previous years. x Signi…cant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Full sample estimates include controls for research areas. ATE is the sample average treatment e¤ect. ATT is average treatment e¤ect on treated (with contract). ATC is the average treatment e¤ect on controls (without contract). Matching procedure is implemented with replacement, using 4 matches per observation, and the Mahalanobis metric, based on the sample covariance matrix of the covariates, is used to measure the distance among covariate values. See notes to Table 4 . The reference value is the average of the outcome variable at the time of the application for all the individuals (ATE), for the contract recipients (ATT) and for the non-recipients (ATC), correspondingly. x Signi…cant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
See Notes to Table 4 .
Data Appendix
The resulted in a contract, we retain that application and discard the rest of them. If none of the applications resulted in a contract and there are several records for the same "applicantresearch area"pair, we retain the application that received the highest score. This selection criterion involves discarding applications, but not individuals or contracts. Finally, some researchers have very common surnames. We performed an exhaustive search to guarantee that the contributions retrieved from Google Scholar correspond to the speci…ed researchers and not other researchers. We eliminated 37 individuals for whom we could not guarantee the authorship of all the contributions assigned to them. 
